What is coordination in campaign finance?

The coordination prohibition is the foundational structural rule of post-Citizens United campaign finance law. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA, 52 U.S.C. Section 30101 et seq.) defines the line at Section 30116(a)(7): an 'expenditure made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate.' Once outside spending is classified as a coordinated expenditure -- and therefore a contribution -- it becomes subject to the full apparatus of FECA's contribution rules: the per-election limits on what any single person may contribute to a federal candidate's campaign, the source prohibitions that bar corporations and labor unions from making direct contributions to federal candidates (52 U.S.C. Section 30118), and the disclosure and registration requirements for political committees. A super PAC that coordinates spending with a presidential campaign would be making an illegal corporate contribution to a federal candidate -- prohibited regardless of amount. The coordination rule is therefore not merely a technical reporting requirement; it is the legal foundation that makes the unlimited super PAC spending permitted by Citizens United constitutionally and structurally valid.

The constitutional principle behind the coordination rule traces to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in which the Supreme Court drew a foundational distinction between contributions and expenditures. The Court held that direct contributions to a candidate's campaign -- money that goes into the campaign's treasury and is controlled by the campaign -- create a cognizable risk of quid pro quo corruption: the candidate knows precisely who gave what amount, and the potential for reciprocal official favoritism is real and immediate. That corruption risk was found sufficient to justify the dollar limits Congress imposed in FECA. Independent expenditures, by contrast, are made entirely separately from the campaign; the candidate does not receive the funds, and the spender decides on its own what to say and how to spend. Because uncoordinated spending does not create the same direct financial relationship between the donor and the officeholder, Buckley held that Congress could not constitutionally cap independent expenditures -- doing so would restrict speech without a sufficient justification. The coordination rule implements this constitutional distinction in practice: an expenditure is protected from Congress's capping authority only if it is genuinely independent; once it becomes coordinated, the expenditure loses its First Amendment insulation and can be regulated as a contribution.

The Supreme Court addressed the coordination question directly in two cases involving political party spending. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) ('Colorado I'), the Court held that FECA could not constitutionally limit a political party's purely independent expenditures on behalf of its federal candidates; when a party spends money without any coordination with its own nominees, that spending is as constitutionally protected as independent spending by any other entity. The majority expressly reserved the question of whether coordinated party spending -- expenditures made in consultation with the party's own candidates -- could be limited under FECA. Five years later, in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) ('Colorado II'), the Court answered that reserved question: FECA's limits on coordinated expenditures by political parties were upheld. The majority held that when a party coordinates spending with its own candidate, the arrangement raises the same circumvention risks as direct contributions; without limits on coordinated party spending, wealthy donors could route unlimited money through a party committee to the party's own nominee, defeating the purpose of FECA's contribution limits entirely. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), later extended the protection for genuinely independent expenditures to corporations and unions, but did not alter the coordinated-expenditure framework: the Citizens United majority expressly noted that it was leaving 'in place' the contribution limits, anti-coordination rules, and the distinction between independent and coordinated spending.

For the 2028 presidential election, the coordination prohibition applies to every entity that spends money independently to influence the outcome. Super PACs affiliated with 2028 presidential campaigns must maintain genuine operational independence: they may not receive strategic direction, polling data, internal messaging frameworks, or advertising targets from the campaign; they may not employ former campaign staffers in roles that allow them to share nonpublic campaign strategy within a period prescribed by FEC rules; they may not use the same vendors as the campaign under arrangements that enable information to flow between the two operations; and they may not produce or distribute communications in direct response to a request or suggestion from any campaign official or agent. The same prohibition applies to 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations and 501(c)(6) trade associations that fund dark-money independent expenditures and electioneering communications in the 2028 cycle: a 501(c)(4) that coordinates its election spending with a 2028 presidential campaign converts that spending into a prohibited corporate contribution, triggering FECA's source restrictions regardless of the amount. Campaigns and affiliated outside groups typically maintain formal information barriers -- sometimes called 'walls' or 'firewalls' -- and avoid joint vendors and shared advisers to demonstrate that independence is genuine and not merely nominal. The Federal Election Commission enforces the coordination prohibition through civil enforcement actions; knowing and willful violations can also be referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution under 52 U.S.C. Section 30109.